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JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS IN WISCONSIN
Two recent Wisconsin cases' once again raise the problem of joint
bank accounts. The scope of this comment will be limited to the rights
of a depositor and co-depositor (the latter is sometimes referred to as
"beneficiary," "joint owner," "joint payee" or "donee-survivor")
where the account was created by the funds of the depositor. To be
distinguished are situations where the joint deposit was created by the
funds of both, 2 or where the co-depositor is excluded from any right
of withdrawal during the lifetime of the depositor,3 or deposits in the
sole name of the donee-survivor with or without his knowledge or
deposits in the depositor's own name in trust for the donee-survivor.
Since joint bank accounts have become a more common method of
deposit, courts have long sought a satisfactory solution to uphold the
right of the survivor in such accounts.5 Prior to 1935 Wisconsin fol-
lowed the gift theory to uphold the right of survivorship.6 In the Mar-
shall Ilsley Bank case 7 the court, in discussing the conflicting theories
as laid out by the decisions of other jurisdictions, remarked that: "...
under each of those theories the ultimate determination as to the
ownership of the deposit depends upon the court's findings under the
evidence as to the intention of the original owner, and whether he
actually took the necessary legal steps to effectuate his intention."
Under the gift theory, the necessary legal steps to effectuate intention
"were the relinquishment by the depositor of the exclusive possession
and control of his documentary evidence thereof and of his owner-
ship thereof."" Relinquishment of documentary evidence or of owner-
ship was dependent upon the type of joint tenancy created inasmuch
as a joint tenancy in personal property could be created orally as well
as by written instrument9 providing the requisite unities of time, title,
interest and possession were present. The relinquishment of control
requirement was fraught with entanglement: what is the practicality
of a joint bank account if "control" must be relinquished; what con-
stitutes relinquishment; when must control be relinquished? It soon
became readily apparent that this theory was cumbersome, inasmuch
as it presented an insurmountable "necessary legal step" of relinquish-
I Plainse v. Engle, 262 Wis. 506, 56 N.W. 2d 89, 262 Wis. 518, 57 N.W. 2d 586
rehearing (1953); Boehmer v. Boehmer, 264 Wis. 15, 58 N.W. 2d 411 (1953).
2 Compare: New Jersey Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Archibald, 91 N.J. Eq.
82, 108 A. 434 (1919) with Tormey v. Cassidy, 69 RI 302, 33 A2d 181 (1943).3 See Note, 155 ALR 1084.
4 See Notes, 59 ALR 975; 157 ALR 925; 168 ALR 1324.
5 For collected cases, See Notes, 48 ALR 189; 66 ALR 881; 103 ALR 1123;
135 ALR 993; 149 ALR 879. See, 42 Ky. L.J. 125 (1953).
6 Marshall Ilsley v. Voight, 214 Wis. 27, 252 N.W. 355 (1934).
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 In re Gabler's Estate: Petrus v. Lucas, Wis. 60 N.W. 2nd 720 (1953).
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ment of control, which, when compared with the clear intention of
the depositor to retain the right to withdraw from the joint bank ac-
count, frustrated the workability of the joint bank account device.
Consequently, in 1935, when two joint bank account cases arose,10 the
court, after carefully considering former decisions, determined that
the contract theory was more consonant with logic, good principles
and good public policy"'-i.e., logic, inasmuch as men intend the re-
sult of their acts, good principles, inasmuch as the relationship arises
from a contract, and good public policy, inasmuch as acts are given
legal meaning insofar as possible correlative with intention. The
court, stating among other things, that "the result of the application of
this theory is desirable."'12
Although the expressions of our Supreme Court upon the right of
survivorship in joint bank accounts have not been numerous, and the
fact situations must be carefully distinguished to ascertain the correct
doctrine, yet they nevertheless afford a general guide for determining
the contract doctrine. Consequently, the procedure will be to first
ascertain the elements of the contract doctrine and secondly, to dis-
,cuss some problems arising under joint bank accounts in their relation
to this doctrine.
A
WISCONSIN CONTRACT DOCTRINE OF JOINT BANK AccouNTS
The procedure in creating the account varies, although apparently
banks are now often using a contract form approved by the American
Banker's Association. The usual procedure is a form signed by both the
depositor and the co-depositor declaring joint ownership with rights of
withdrawal and survivorship. In other instances, the names merely
appear jointly on an account or passbook.' 3 Consequently, the form
of a bank account which gives rise to a joint interest with rights of
survivorship varies. Thus, in both the Stayer and Skilling cases,' 4 a
joint bank account with rights of survivorship was recognized al-
though in neither was there a written contract of deposit or a sig-
nature card. In the Stayer case, there were only certificates of deposit
made payable to the order of "Joseph Stayer or Frank J. Stayer." In
the Skilling case, a passbook to a savings account and the bank records
read "Edward or John M. Skilling" and by a rubber stamp notation
10 In re Staver's Estate: Wimmer v. Stayer, 218 Wis. 114, 260 N.W. 655 (1935).
It re Skilling's Estate: Skilling v. Skilling, 218 Wis. 574, 260 N.W. 660 (1935).
"In Schwauke v. Garlt, 219 Wis. 367, 263 N.W. 176 (1935), the court decided
that Section 13, article 14 of the Wisconsin constitution does not prohibit
a change by the court as to which principles should govern such a transaction.
12 In re Stav'er's Estate, supra, n. 10.
13 Cf. Doubler v. Doubler, 412 Ill. 597, 107 N.E. 2d 789 (1952) wherein it was
held that there was a statutory necessity of a signature card signed by both
parties to create a joint tenancy in a bank account.14Supra, n. 10.
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upon the bank records and passbook "the money herein deposited is
owned jointly by the persons named and is subject to the order of
either, the balance at the death of either to belong to the survivor."
Once a joint deposit contract has been entered into with a bank, a
joint ownership of a res by a contract has been created, and it is
governed by the principles of contracts. The precise meaning of the
rule that joint bank accounts are governed by the principles of con-
tracts is that the legal interest created by the contract of deposit (writ-
ten, oral, or implied), either as evidenced by the instrument . . . cer-
tificate or passbook . . . initially delivered by the bank or other ev-
idence of a contract, "vests ownership in a chose in action according to
its terms."'51 The contract creating the joint ownership must be based
on a consideration, and therein lies the crux of the difficulties under the
contract theory, for the courts have not made their position too clear.'
At first blush, the doctrine of donee beneficiary would seem to resolve
any problem of consideration, but as the court pointed out in the
Stayer case: "a joint promisee such as is involved here (promisee under
certificate of deposit) may not be treated as technically the beneficiary
under a contract for the benefit of a third person" inasmuch as the
doctrine of donee beneficiary is limited to contracts which "relate only
to the rights of a person other than the promisee." The court further
pointed out that under the doctrine of donee beneficiary it first must
be established "that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the
Is In re Staver's Estate, supra, n. 10.
16 Courts which professedly follow the contract theory have applied it in two
basic ways:
(a) "Gift of an interest therein created by contract," Goldston v. Ran-
dolph, 293 Mass. 253, 199 N.E. 896 (1936), i.e., the contract takes the
place of the delivery originally required.
(b) "The agreement of the depositor determines the rights of the parties,"
Hood v. Commonwealth Trust & Savings Bank, 376 Ill. 413, 34 N.E.
2d 414 (1941). Under this approach the courts have split:
(1) The survivor is entitled to the deposit on the basis of a con-
tract between the depositors themselves which was supported
by consideration. Ulmer v. Society for Savings, 35 Ohio App.
525, 44 N.E. 2d 578 (1942).(2) The survivor is entitled to the deposit on the basis of third
party beneficiary under the contract between the depositor and
the bank.
(3) The survivor is entitled to the deposit on the basis of a no-
vation whereby the account originally in the depositor's name
was changed to a joint account, Chippendale v. North Adams
Savings Bank, 222 Mass. 499, 111 N.E. 371 (1916) ; Deal's
Adm'r v. Merchants and Mechanics Savings Bank, 120 Va.
297, 91 S.E. 135 (1917).
(4) The survivor is entitled to the deposit on the basis that he is
the surviving joint promisee. As to the problem of considera-
tion, the court in Sage v. Flueck, 132 Ohio St. 377, 7 N.E. 2d
802 (1937) said the act of depositing is an execution of the
contract and consideration is dispensed with. In Mardis v.
Stein, 293 Pa. 13, 141 A. 629 (1928), the court said that the
signature card for the joint deposit signed and sealed, con-
stituted a contract, the seal importing consideration.
[.Voi...37
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promise of all or part of the performance thereof is to make a gift to
the beneficiary"' 7 .. .that is to say, there must be a donative intent in
the sense that the person to whom the performance was to run was in-
tended to be a donee beneficiary. At this point, the proponents of the
donee beneficiary doctrine as the proper solution of the problem, might
assert that conceding all of this, nevertheless, the court's position begs
the question: for why was the survivor treated as a promisee and what
consideration did he furnish to become a promisee? To this the court
might reply that the promise was joint as a result of the purchase
by the deceased depositor of a contract right, which from its creation
was to be held jointly and it is immaterial that the survivor furnished
no consideration inasmuch as a promisor may undertake a binding
promise for consideration furnished by a third party.'8 The Wisconsin
court insists that the survivor is only analogous to the donee beneficiary
inasmuch as no consideration is furnished and ratification is presumed,
but the position of the survivor is stronger than that of the donee ben-
eficiary inasmuch as no question of donative intent is involved. Thus,
the court concluded in the Stayer case that "certainly his position is
analogous to, and even somewhat stronger than that- of the donee ben-
eficiary, if, indeed, there is a substantial, rather than a technical, dif-
ference between them."
The joint bank account concept must be clearly distinguished from
similar transactions, such as a gift .of a bank account to an individual
(a gift of a singly owned res)'1 which would be governed by the prin-
ciples of gifts, or the joint ownership of personal property other than
a bank account" which would be governed by the law of joint tenan-
cies in personal property. Further, the principles of contracts which
normally govern a joint bank account, relate only to joint bank ac-
counts with a present interest and are not applicable to joint bank ac-
counts for convenience :21 in the latter case, equity affects the legal
title of the surviving joint payee by imposing a trust in favor of the
deceased depositor's heirs.
In Wisconsin, under the usual joint bank account, the depositor
and the co-depositor are co-owners subject to be divested ... i.e., sub-
ject to withdrawals by either and rights of survivorship (the survivor
17In re Staver's Estate, supra, n. 10., quoting the RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS§133.18 O'Brien v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 11 N.W. 2d 412 (1943) ; Hill v. Havens,
242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W. 2d 870 (1951) ; 38 Harv. L. Rev. 243.
29 Ruffalo v. Savage, 252 Wis. 175, 31 N.W. 2d 175 (1948) ; Tucker v. Limrow,
248 Wis. 143, 21 N.W. 2d 252 (1946).20 Farr v. Trustee Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 83 Wis. 466, 53 N.W. 738 (1892);
Central Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Schumacher, 230 Wis. 591, 284 N.W. 562(1939).
21 In re Staver's Estate, supra, n. 10; In re Skilling's Estate, supra, n. 10;
Plainse v. Engle, supra, n. 1; Estate of Krause, 241 Wis. 41, 4 N.W. 2d 122(1942).
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taking by virtue of the contract of deposit). Consequently, either the
depositor or the joint payee may withdraw the entire account without
liability and this may be done without the consent of the other, pro-
viding there is no provision to the contrary in the contract of deposit.
22
The legal interest of the co-depositor is fundamentally determined
by the intention of the depositor as indicated by the contract with the
bank. But since the deposit contract may be written, oral or implied,
it follows that the usual signature card is not the only method of creat-
ing a joint tenancy in a bank account with rights of survivorship. In
the circumstances where the joint account is not written but is an
oral or implied contract, the court would probably look to the sub-
stance of the transaction and determine the intention in the light of all
circumstances. 23 However, where there is an unambiguous written
contract, the courts will follow it. Yet even then, parol evidence would
be admissible to determine the intention of a deceased depositor inso-
far as it relates to a joint account created for convenience, so that it
may be shown by clear and satisfactory evidence "that the purpose of
the deposit was to constitute the payee other than the depositor a mere
agent." 24 The admissibility of such evidence is not to vary the terms of
the contract, but merely to ascertain the actual intention of the de-
positor under the theory that equity will intervene to prevent fraud.25
A further development in the Wisconsin contract doctrine of joint
bank accounts occurred in the Boehnier case 26 where the court held
that the guardian of an incompetent depositor does not succeed to the
depositor's privilege of election in a joint bank account which has
rights of withdrawal and survivorship--i.e., the guardian cannot ex-
ercise the incompetent's personal right to either withdraw part or all
of the account or allow it to remain intact until death. Instead, the
joint bank account is considered in custodia legis of county court and
hence any withdrawals by either the joint payee or the incompetent
depositor through his guardian is subject to the approval of the court.
This is done on the theory, consistent with contract law, that a personal
privilege of the ward to elect between alternative or inconsistent rights
or claims does not pass to the guardian.27
22 Cf. 161 ALR 71; 77 ALR 799. Apparently, in some instances, a joint bank
account may become irrevocable on the part of the depositor by virtue of
some oral contract; Kessler v. Olen, 228 Wis. 662, 280 N.W. 352 (1938) ; ...
it may appear that decedent's placing his savings and cash bank accounts in ajoint account with himself placed the funds beyond his power to reclaim
them wholly to himself. Compare, 155 ALR. 1084.
2348 C.J.S. 919; 9 C.J.S. 286.
24 In re Staver's Estate, supra, n. 10; Compare Matthew v. Moncrief, 135 F 2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Cf. 149 ALR 862.25 Hannon v. Kelly, 156 Wis. 509, 146 N.W. 512 (1914).
26Boehmer v. Boehmer, supra, n. 1; Compare Ulmer v. Society for Savings,
44 N.E. 2d 578 (1942).2TVan Steen Wyck v. Washburn, 59 Wis. 483, 17 N.W. 289 (1883); Kay v.
Erickson, 209 Wis. 147, 244 N.W. 625 (1932).
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There are two sections28 of the Wisconsin statutes referring to
joint bank accounts. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has had no oc-
casion to consider section 222.12(9). In reading this section, a prob-
lem arises as to why the Legislature saw fit to limit the application of
this section, which is in derogation of the common law, to deposits in
mutual savings banks. Section 249, subdivision 3 of the New York
Banking Law (now Section 239, Subdivision 3) as set forth in Massey
v. Cullen 2 is identical with Section 222.12(9) of the Wisconsin statutes
with the one exception that Wisconsin has inserted the word "mutual"
in front of "savings bank." Under this statute, the New York courts
have held that two presumptions are created :30
"(a) a rebuttable presumption is created during the joint lives
of the parties by a transfer creating a present interest in a de-
posit in a savings bank made in the names of a depositor and an-
other person 'in form to be paid to either or the survivor of
them' which becomes 'the property of such persons as joint ten-
ants.' Hence the intention of the depositor is an issue of fact.
(b) an irrebuttable presumption (in the absence of fraud or
undue influence) exists only in cases of succession by survivor-
ship of any remaining moneys on deposit. Thus, the presump-
tion does not apply as to any money withdrawn by either party
during their joint lifetime-i.e., the presumption is not con-
clusive after the death of either as to any money then with-
drawn."
2 8 Wxs. STATS. (1923) §221.45:
"When a deposit has been made, or shall hereafter be made, in any bank,
trust company bank or mutual savings bank transacting business in this
state in the names of two persons, payable to either, or payable to either
or the survivor, such deposit, or any part thereof, or any interest or div-
idend thereon, may be paid to either of said persons whether the other be
living or not; and the receipt or acquittance of the person so paid shall be a
valid and sufficient release and discharge to the bank for any payment so
made."
Wis. STATs. (1923) §222.12(9):
"When a deposit shall be made by any person in the names of such depositor
and another person and in form to be paid to either or the survivor of
them, such deposit and any additions thereto made, either of such persons
after the making thereof, shall become the property of such persons as joint
tenants, and the same together with all dividends thereon shall be held for the
exclusive use of such persons and may be paid to either during the lifetime
of both or to the survivor after the death of one of them, and such payment
and the receipt or acquittance of the one to whom such payment is made
shall be a valid and sufficient release and discharge to such mutual savings
bank for all payments made on account of such deposit prior to the receipt
by such mutual savings bank of notice in writing not to pay such deposit in
accordance with the terms thereof. The making of the deposit in such form
shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evidence, in
any action or proceeding to which either such mutual savings bank or the
surviving depositor is a party, of the intention of both depositors to vest title
to such deposit and the additions thereto in such survivor."
29 Massey v. Cullen, 145 Misc. 655, 260 N.Y.S. 20 (1932).30 Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E. 506 (1929) ; Re Poriando, 256
N.Y. 423, 176 N.E. 826 (1931); Re Cokey, 140 Misc. 779, 252 N.Y.S. 434(1931); Re Hills, 145 Misc. 631, 260 N.Y.S. 635 (1932); Re Timko, 150
Misc. 701, 270 N.Y.S. 323 (1934); Re Juedel, 280 N.Y. 37, 19 N.E. 2d 671(1939).
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In addition, the New York courts have held that the statutory form
is an absolute protection to the bank unless written notice has been
given by one of the depositors as authorized by statute: "and such
payment and the receipt or acquittance of the one to whom such pay-
ment is made shall be a valid and sufficient release . . . prior to the
receipt... of notice in writing not to pay such deposit in accordance
with the terms thereof." However, this notice is not effectual as a re-
vocation or cancellation of the joint bank account, but merely with-
draws the immunity given by statute.31
On the other hand, Section 221.45 of the Wisconsin Statutes has
occasioned three comments by the court. Thus in Marshall & isley
Bank v. Voight3 2 the court said:
"the purpose and effect of that statute are to render legally
effective receipts or acquittance given to a bank upon its pay-
ment of a deposit to either of the persons to whom an account
was made payable, regardless of the actual legal rights of such
persons, as between themeselves, to such deposits."
Re Staver's Estate3 modified the ruling in the Marshall & Ilsley case
(although not necessarily the comment on Section 221.45) and in com-
menting on Section 221.45, the court stated:
"Our banking statute, Section 221.45, recognizes the right of
survivorship where the certificate of deposit is in the names
of two persons, payable to either, or payable to either or the
survivor."
In Boehmer v. Boehmer 4 the guardian of an incompetent depositor
argued "that in the absence of evidence other than the form of the
deposit itself, no presumption of a joint tenancy arises, and that such
deposit is only conclusive on the question of both parties having a
31 California has given a similar construction to such a statute: California
Civil Code, §1828; Bank Act, Deering's General Laws, 1931, Act 652, §15 a;
Wallace v. Riley, 23 Cal. App. 2d 669, 74 P. 2d 800 (1937) ; Pfingst v. Goet-
ting, 96 Cal. App. 2d 293, 215 P. 2d 93 (1950); Paterson v. Comastri, 244
P. 2d 902 (Cal. 1952). However it should be noted that both California and
New York approached the construction of this statute under the gift
theory. On the other hand, Michigan, one of the jurisdictions which fol-
lows the joint deposit rule in the Stayer case (the court in Ruffalo v.
Savage, 22 Wis. 175, 31 N.W. 2d 175 (1948) stated that: "the joint de-
posit rule in the Staver case followed the rule in Massachusetts, Ohio, Mich-
igan . . .") has a statute which combines the major elements of the two
Wisconsin statutes; Cf. Act No. 286, Public Acts 1937 (Stat. Ann. 1942
Supp. §Z-3.303) amending 3 Comp. Law 1929, S. 12063; Frank v. Schultz, 295
Mich. 714, 295 N.W. 374 (1940) ; Manufacturer's Nat. Bank v. Schirmer, 303
Mich. 598, 6 N.W. 2d 908 (1942) ; Pence v. Wessels, 320 Mich. 195, 30 N.W.
2d 834 (1948). However, the Michigan statute expressly applies to any bank
and the deposit form is only prima facie evidence of the intention of the des-
positor.
32 Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Voight, supra, n. 6.
3s In re Staver's Estate, supra, n. 10.
84 Boehmer v. Boehmer, supra, n. 1.
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right to withdraw the funds as long as both live and remain compe-
tent." The court in rejecting this argument stated:
"Section 221.45, statutes, especially provides that a joint tenancy
is created upon such facts as are presented in this case .... In
the Stayer case... the court construed that statute as giving the
right of survivorship to either payee; and found, at least
inferentially, that such a situation creates a joint tenancy."
Contrary to the Wisconsin position, it has been generally held that
statutes such as Section 221.45 do not effect the title to the deposit
as between the parties other than the bank and the purpose of such a
statute is merely to protect banks in making payments.
35
B
TAXATION OF JOINT BANK AcCOUNT
Upon the creation of a joint bank account, where both parties can
withdraw but only one has contributed, no gift tax results under the
Federal or Wisconsin law. The federal gift tax consequences of a joint
bank account are covered by Regulation 108, 86.2 (4) which pro-
vides that a gift tax is due on any withdrawals to the extent of the
withdrawals when made by a joint payee who has not contributed or
if he has contributed, when in excess of the contribution. In such
a case, section 1008 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that
the donor is primarily liable. However, such taxability is subject to
the annual exclusion of $3,00031 and if the joint owners are husband
and wife, a gift tax marital deduction may be taken :37 in addition the
lifetime exemption of $30,000 would be available.38 Hence, even as-
suming the Commissioner presumes the party withdrawing did not
contribute to the account (and such contributions cannot be traced),
the exclusions and exemptions available will often make such problems
relatively unimportant. The Wisconsin gift tax consequences of a
joint bank account are partially controlled by the Berry case3 9 wherein
the court decided that where a joint bank account is derived solely
from the funds of the husband, the surviving wife is not subject to a
gift tax under section 72.75 upon the one half in said account not
subjected to inheritance tax under section 72.01 (6). It may be implied
from the case that a gift results upon withdrawals to the extent of
the withdrawals since the rationale for the result in that case is a
revocable transfer. If such be the gift liability before death, then sec-
tion 72.81 (4) makes the donee of the gift personally liable for the
359 C.J.S. 595; See, 48 C.J.S. 924.36 INT. REV. CODE, §1003.
37 INt. REV. CODE, §1004 (a) (3) (A) and (D).3 8 INT. REV. CODE, §1004 (a) (1).
s9 Wisconsin Department of Taxation v. Barry, 258 Wisconsin 544, 46 NW 2d
757 (1951).
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gift tax; if unpaid when due, then the donor and the donee are jointly
and severally liable for its payment.
During the lifetime of the depositors, income tax problems may
arise. Federal income tax liability arises in joint bank accounts bear-
ing interest since interest payments are taxable under section 22 (a)
of the Internal Revenue Code.40 Further, a bank may deduct interest
paid on its deposits, since a creditor-debtor relationship exists be-
tween a bank and its depositors.41 In addition, the depositors may
take a bad debt deduction when a bank is closed. 42 The question of who
is taxable on the income is important only where a joint return is
not used (either because the joint owners are not spouses or, if
spouses, elect to file separately) because the income splitting computa-
tion on a joint return has the effect of taxing the combined income
as if one half belonged to each. 43 When joint returns are not used, the
divisibility for federal tax purposes of income from jointly owned
property is determined under state law. 44 Generally, under state law,
it may be presumed that joint bank accounts belong equally to each
spouse regardless of how much each one may have put into the ac-
count.45 This presumption may be predicated on the analogous principal
that each joint tenant is entitled to his share of the profits and hence
may each separately report one half of the income; strictly speaking,
however, a joint bank account under Wisconsin law is not a technical
joint tenancy.46
40 Cf. U.S. TaRAs. REG. 118, 3922 (a) (1). The constructive receipt doctrine
would apply as to the time the income is to be reported (US. TaRAs. REG. 118,
39.423) ; thus, interest credited on a joint bank acount would be income to
the depositors when credited, notwithstanding bank rules requiring so many
days notice before withdrawals are permitted. Such interest would be reportable
as income and not as capital gain: see 29 Taxes 741. Certain exceptions, as to
reportability, are authorized: for example, 119 (a) (1) (A) excepts interest
on deposits paid to non-resident aliens and foreign corporations.41 INT. REV. CODE, §23 (b); U.S. TREAs. REG. 118, 39. 23 (b)-1.
42 Cf. 1954 P.H. FEDERAL TAX SERVICE 13, 875-A.
43 INT. REV. CODE, §51 (b).
44 Alfred Hafner 31 B T A 338; James Nicholson, 32 B T A 977 (aff. without
discussion of this point, 90 F2d 978.) As an example, and by way of an-
alogy, in a joint tenancy in land, income may be equally split if the state law
governing the ownership of the property meets the following Treasury re-
quirements: 1. the state law must permit the wife to own property herself;
2. the state law must permit a joint tenancy between husband and wife with
respect to the type of property involved; 3. the state law must permit a valid
gift of property between husband and wife, where the joint tenancy is created
by gift from husband to wife. (I.T. 3825, CuM. BULL. 1946-2, 51; I.T. 3754
CUM. BuLL. 1944, 143.) So far, the Treasury department has published iulings
on only three states: Wisconsin (I.T. 3754, CuM. BULL. 1945, 143), Colorado
(I.T. 3825, Cum. BULL. 1946-2, 51) and Indiana (I.T. 3898, CuM. BULL. 1948-1,
55). These rulings held that the laws of these states permitted the splitting of
income and capital gain or losses from property held in joint tenancy.
45Walter E. Dunham, 27 B T A 1068; H. W. Evans 5 T C 336.
461t has been suggested in 4 TAx LAw REVIEW 3, 26, that perhaps the rule of
U.S. Savings Bonds (I.T. 3301, Cum. BuLL. 1939-2, 75) might apply "to in-
terst on a joint bank account where the contributing spouse under local law
[Vol. 37
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Section 71.03 (1) (c) of the Wisconsin statutes also requires the
inclusion of interest payments in gross income. Such income is split
equally 7 and Rule 109, issued by the Department of Taxation in pur-
suance of its authority under 71.11 (24) (a), requires separate income
tax returns for a husband and wife if each has a gross income of
$600 or more or if either has any net income when their combined net
income is $1,400 or more.48
On the death of one of the parties to a joint bank account, in the
absence of a joint return, the survivior takes free of any federal in-
come tax deficiency on the interest from the joint bank account owned
by the decedent;49 but if decedent's gross estate (which can include
more than the probate estate) exceeds $60,000 a problem of federal
estate tax liability arises. The federal estate tax provision on joint
bank accounts" provides that the entire value of the account51 is to
be included in the decedent's gross estate subject to the following
exceptions:
a. No part of the account is included in the gross estate of the
decedent if the survivor originally owned it
b. No part of the account contributed by the survivor is in-
cluded in the gross estate of the decedent.
c. No part of the account attributable to the survivor's pro-
portionate share created by a third person is included in the
gross estate of the decedent.
Consequently, it follows that on the death of a joint owner, there is
a prima facie presumption that the entire value of the jointly held
bank account is part of his gross estate, but this may be rebutted
by showing the value traceable to the survivor which would then be
excluded from decedent's estate. This burden of proof as to the sur-
vivor's contribution is on the personal representative of the deceased
co-owner. The personal representative of the deceased co-owner meets
this burden by positive proof that either all or part of the money orig-
inally belonged to the survivor or all or part of the money was ac-
quired from the decedent for full and adequate consideration.5 2 The
has the power to regain individual possession of the funds contributed by him
to the account."
47 See, Estate of J. S. Mahoney, 233 Wis. 138, 288 NW 763 (1939); Estate of
Hounsell, 252 Wis 138, 31 NW 2d 203 (1948), cert. U.S. Supreme Court, Oc-
tober 18, 1948; George H. Moeller v. Wis. Department of Taxation 3 W B T
A 279 (1947).
48 See, Amerpohl v. Tax Commission, 225 Wis. 62, 272 NW 472 (1937).
49 Irvine v. Helvering, 99 F2d 265.5 0 INT. REv. CoDE, §811 (e). Cf. annotations in 75 L. Ed. 157 and 84 L Ed. 620.
51 Valuation would be the date of death unless fluctuation in the value of assets
make it desirable to use the optional valuation date provided in 811 (j).
52 Estate of Ralph Owen Howard 9 T.C. 1192 (1942). One possible solution in
the tracing problem would be the application of "best estimate" of the sena-
rate contribution under the rule of Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F2d 540 (1930).
In this connection see Estate of Mary Louise Selecman, P-H 1950 TC Mun.
Dec. #50, 267 (1950).
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problem of tracing ownership of deposits and withdrawals is exception-
ally difficult and even copies of all the deposit slips used in the years
under review would be of little aid. Perhaps the best solution would
be to keep detailed records during the maintenance of the joint ac-
count, if it were substantial. Further, even if it were assumed that the
personal representative was able to trace the various deposits and with-
drawals, the joint account might be caught under other sections of the
code.58 However, this possibility was limited to 811 (c) (1) (A)-
(transfers in contemplation of death)-by the Tax Court in the case of
Estate of Nathalie Koussevitsky54 wherein it was held that 811 (e) is
the exclusive method for the taxability of joint interests except where
the joint interest was created in contemplation of death. This excep-
tion is based on the rationale that 811 (c) is more specific than 811 (e).
The problem would only arise where the survivor had originally given
all the funds to the deceased and later the deceased establishes a joint
account with the survivor. The Commissioner would be unable to in-
clude any part of the account under 811 (e), if it is assumed that there
is positive proof of tracing, but the Commissioner then could use 811
(c) to include the entire value.
Ordinarily, the interest of a decedent in a joint bank account which
passes to the surviving spouse qualifies for the marital deduction 55 and
may qualify for the gift tax credit against an estate tax.51 If a non-
spouse survivor dies within five years, a deduction for a previously
taxed account is allowed, subject to the limitations of 812 (c).
It can be seen from the above that unless the advantages derived
from joint ownership of a bank account outweigh federal estate tax
considerations it is inadvisable to hold as joint owners. Some non-
tax factors to be considered in this decision are the survivor's im-
mediate ownership without the cost and delay of probate proceedings
5 7
and the fact that, ordinarily, accrued interest is free from the claims of
the deceased's creditors.58
The inheritance tax consequences of a joint bank account in Wis-
consin depend on 72.01 (6) which provides that where there is a joint
bank account, it is deemed that it was held as a tenancy in common
and the decedent's share had been bequeathed to the survivor: thus
either one half of the joint bank account, if there are only two de-
positors, or the decedent's proportionate' share, if there are more
than two depositors, is deemed to be a taxable transfer on the death of
53Estate of Henry Wilson, 2 T.C. 1059 (1943).
54 5 T.C. 650.
55 Ir. REv. CoDE §812(e).
56 INT. REV. CODE §813 (a); 936 (b).5 7 Although a delay in obtaining a release is likely under Wisconsin law. See
p.141, infra.58 See p. 143, infra.
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one of the depositors as if bequeathed by the decedent. Consequently,
the relative contributions during their lifetime or the fact that the en-
tire sum was contributed by one of the co-owners is immaterial; as
the court stated in In re Hounsell's Estate:59 "--all that is needed to
set the statute in motion is to have property in the joint names of
the parties." It can be seen that it is possible in certain situations
that a husband may have to pay an inheritance tax on a joint bank ac-
count created with his own funds.60 Thus if it is assumed that H (hus-
band) created a joint account of $20,000 with W (wife) and W pre-
deceased him, H would have to pay an inheritance tax on $10,000,
subject to exemptions allowed in Wisconsin.6 The only possible way H
could escape the tax would be to show, by clear and satisfactory evi-
dence, "a transaction clearly indicating a trust relation or the exist-
ence of an agency only." 62 At the hearing for the determination of in-
heritance tax, H would be incompetent, under section 325.16, Statutes
(the dead man's rule), to testify to any transactions with W,63 conse-
quently, it will be difficult to meet the burden of proof. Instead of
trying to establish a trust or agency at the inheritance tax hearing, H
could proceed against the estate of W seeking to reform the evidences
of title, but this still would not obviate the effect of section 325.16,
Statutes. On the other hand, if H predeceased W a new factor might
enter into the picture: section 72.17 (2) requires the presumptive in-
clusion of the entire value if the joint ownership were created in con-
templation of death which could be rebutted by W showing such was
not the case by competent evidence.64 The practical difference is that all
of the account would be taxable instead of one-half.
Practical difficulties may be encountered in Wisconsin when the
survivor is in need of liquid assests (essentially this problem would
relate solely to the co-depositor's widow who is the survivor). The
inheritance tax consequences of a joint bank account may tend to tie
up the account because of the effects of two statutes: section 230.48
expressly covers joint bank accounts and apparently requires a certifi-
cate of termination of joint tenancy in personality; section 72.11 (3)
requires that banks which have accounts, in the names of a resident and
others, shall not transfer them unless a notice of time and place be
served on the Tax Department and Public Administrator ten days
prior to the transfer. In addition, the bank must retain a sufficient por-
tion to pay the tax unless the Tax Department consents to the transfer
59 252 Wis. 138, 31 NW 2d 203 (1948).
60 Ibid; Compare In re Atldnson's Estate: Atklnson v. Wisconsin Department of
Taxation, 261 Wis 481, 54 NW 2d 185 (1952).61 Wis. STATS. §72.04.6 2 Hounsell, supra, n. 59.
63 Ibid.
64 Wisconsin Tax Com. Ruling 541, October 1, 1926.
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in writing, although the Tax Department may issue a certificate author-
izing the delivery whenever no tax is due. The Wisconsin Department
of Taxation has prepared a form similar to a questionaire entitled
"Application for consent to transfer securities and property jointly
owned or controlled pursuant to 72.11 (3) of the statutes" which is
used in obtaining the transfer certificates.6 5 The form is executed
under oath and one copy is sent to the Department of Taxation and
one copy to each Public Administratior of the county in which the
decedent was a resident. A transfer certificate is issued, if, from the
face of the application, no inheritance tax is due. If from the face of
the application, it is apparent that an inheritance tax is due, then the
transfer consent certificate is sent to the Public Administrator where
it is held until procedure is taken under 230.48 or until a tender of
an amount sufficient to cover any tax on the transfer is made. The in-
heritance tax is due on the termination of the joint tenancy and a
lien arises on the decedent's proportionate share deemed bequeathed. 66
The burden of the tax rests on the survivor, but the administrator or
executor as well as the survivor are personally liable for the payment
of the tax.6 7 However, it seems possible that by a carefully worded
provision in a will, the tax which would otherwise be payable by the
survivor, is payable out of the decedent's estate.68
No deductions in computing the inheritance tax on the joint bank
account are authorized unless the entire estate consists of joint prop-
erty, in which case the only deductions allowed are filing fees, appraisal
fees, attorney fees, and recording fees.6 9 But section 72.04 authorizes
the same personal exemptions from the inheritance tax as are available
in other types of transfers.
C
MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
The problem of the rights of creditors in relation to a joint bank
account has produced conflicting solutions.'0 In Wisconsin, a joint
bank account is not subject to garnishment, although it is not clear
whether the remedies of attachment, execution or supplementary pro-
ceedings are available.71 In those jurisdictions which have considered
65 See Bullinger, Wisconsin Inheritance, Gift, Estate and Emergency Tax Law
Manual (1949).6 6 Wis. STATS. §72.05 (1) ; See Estate of Frederick, 247 Wis. 268, 19 NW 2d 249
(1944).6 TWis. STATs. §72.07; §72.05 (1). Cf 142 A.L.R. 1135, 1 A.L.R. 2d 978.6 8 Estate of LevalIey: First Wisconsin Trust Company et al v. Wisconsin Tax
Commission, 191 Wis. 356, 210 NW 941 (1926); Will of Cudahy, 251 Wis.
116, 28 NW 2d 340 (1947) ; Cf. 1 A.L.R. 2d 1101 (1111).69 Bullinger, supra, n. 65, at 75.
TO Cf Note 116 A.L.R. 1340.
7" Badger Lumber Company v. Stem, 123 Wis. 618, 101 NW 1093. (1905);
Rymer v..Mart, 168 Wis. 493, 170 NW 714 (1919); Gerber v. Ogle Coal Com-
pany, 195 Wis. 578, 218 NW 361 (1928). One possibility, as to the other
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the problem, various results have been reached: in Minnesota, all
or any part of a "joint and several" bank account may be levied upon
for the individual debt of one of the depositors.7 2 In Michigan, a
rebuttable presumption that each are equal contributors and owners of
the funds in a joint account was applied and as joint tenants, the
debtor's ownership is severable for the purpose of meeting the de-
mands of the creditors.7 3 In Pennsylvania, a creditor cannot attach
a joint bank account if it is an estate by the entireties74 but an execu-
tion severs a bank account held in joint tenancy thereby making the
interest of the tenant in common liable.75 In Massachusetts, a creditor
may garnishee a joint bank account for the individual debt of one of
the joint depositors by virtue of a statute which provides, that where
any deposit is made in a bank in the name of two persons, payable to
either or the survivor, then it must be so paid, "if not then attached at
law or in equity in a suit against either of said persons."78
Generally under bankruptcy law, a bank account passes to the
trustee.77 A joint bank account generally passes to the trustee subject
to the right of the non-bankrupt co-depositor to show true ownership.7 8
A conflict of law question can arise in determining whether a
joint tenancy was created or in determining the rights of the survivor.
Generally, it is held that title and rights in a joint bank account are
governed by the law of the place where the deposit had been made
and the account kept.79 Thus, in a Wisconsin case, 0 the court held
that a joint bank account in trust was governed by the law of Michigan
where it was executed and kept, even though the settlor was a resi-
dent of Wisconsin and retained full control over the account during
his life.
The role of a joint bank account in a judgment for divorce in-
volving alimony or a division of the estate is variable since any
judgment is made under the statute8' and the amount of the alimony
remedies, would be to seek equitable relief (after the issuance and levy of
execution) to set aside the claim of the co-depositor on the basis of fraud,
Hyman v. Landry, 135 Wis. 598, 116 NW 236 (1908).
72Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Track, 233 Minn. 467, 47 NW 2d 194 (1951). The
court used very sound reasons for allowing this result: by contract the parties
have virtually declared they are indifferent to the exact percentage of owner-
ship between themselves and therefore should abide the results which flow
from their own declared purpose.
v3 Sussex V.Synder, 307 Mich. 30, 11 NW 2d 642 (1952). Czajkowsld v. Lount,
333 Mich. 156, 52 NW 2d 642 (1952).
74 Goretzka v. Whissen, 87 P. L. T. 57 (1939).75 American Oil Company v. Falconer, 136 Pa. Super. 598, 8 A 2d 418 (1939).
76 GL, c246 §33 (Compare Wis. STATs. §221.45) ; R. H. White Co. v. Lees, 267
Mass. 112, 166 NE 705 (1929).7 7 In re Burofsky, 64 F. Supp. 128 (1946).
79 Olshan v. East New York Savings Bank, 28 F. Supp. 727 (1939).
79 Cf. 25 A.L.R. 2d 1240.
80Boyle v. Kempkin, 243 Wis. 86, 9 NW 2d 589 (1943).81 Wis. STATs. §247.26.
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or property division is discretionary with the court.82 However, joint
accounts are always entirely included in the estate and the fact of
joint ownership is considered immaterial.8 3
Checks drawn upon a joint bank account, in the absence of a con-
tract provision to the contrary, generally required the signature of all
the depositors. 84 However most signature cards creating a joint ac-
count now provide in one form or another that the sums deposited are
subject to the check or receipt of either depositor. Consequently, a
bank, by the contract of deposit and hence without liability, may rec-
ognize a check signed by either withdrawing party on the entire
account.
8 5
The question of murder of one of the parties in a joint bank ac-
count by the other interested party as it affects the rights of survivor-
ship has not been precisely determined in Wisconsin.88 Little har-
mony in the results has been reached in those jurisdictions which have
considered the precise question involved. Three jurisdictions have
concluded that the survivor-murderer is entitled to the money in the
joint bank account because he has a vested interest by virtue of the
contract of deposit.8 7 One jurisdiction held that the murderer was en-
titled to the money in the joint bank account because the statutes re-
lating to joint tenancy were binding on the court and they made no
exception to the right of survivorship. 8 On the other hand, one juris-
diction has held that the murderer is divested of all legal title and
has no right to any of the money on deposit in a joint bank account.8 9
The quasi-constructive trustee doctrine used in Wisconsin"° was ap-
plied by one jurisdiction when the court, on demurrer, applied a con-
structive trust for the benefit of the estate of the decedent upon the
entire balance of a joint and several bank account of a husband and
wife, where the wife feloniously caused the death of the husband
(the wife, with knowledge of decedent's serious heart ailment, of
which he was unaware, coerced decedent to walk with her through
deep. snow on a cold and windy day, thereby causing his death after
he had walked two blocks.) 8 ' ARTHUR SCHELLER, JR.
8 2 Tupitza v. Tupitza, 251 Wis. 257, 29 NW 2d 54 (1947) ; Bruhn v. Bruhn, 197
Wis. 358, 222 NW 242 (1928).8 3 Skrzypzcak v. Skrzypzcak, 252 Wis. 538, 32 NW 2d 243 (1948) ; Wacker v.
Wacker, 199 Wis. 197, 225 NW 749 (1929). Compare Loth v. Loth, 227 Minn.
387, 35 NW 2d 542 (1949).
8461 A.L.R. 967.
85 See Sawyer v. National Shawmut Bank, 306 Mass. 313, 28 NE 2d 455 (1940).
88 In this connection see 32 A.L.R. 2d 1099; 98 A.L.R. 773.
87 Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 NE 2d 872 (1950) ; Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio
St. 432, 195 NE 838 (1935) ; Di Lallo v. Corea, 19 Pa Dist., 282, 81 P.L.J. 119.88 Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P2d 514 (1950).
89 Matter of Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc. 668, 212 NYS 116 (1925) ; Bierbrauer
v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 NYS 176 (1935).
90 In re King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52 NW 2d 885 (1952).
91 Vesey v. Vesey, 54 NW 2d 385, (Minn. 1952).
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